Enhanced three-factor security protocol for consumer USB mass storage devices by He, D. et al.
Enhanced three­factor security protocol 
for consumer USB mass storage devices 
Article 
Accepted Version 
He, D., Kumar, N., Lee, J.­H. and Sherratt, R. S. (2014) 
Enhanced three­factor security protocol for consumer USB 
mass storage devices. IEEE Transactions on Consumer 
Electronics, 60 (1). pp. 30­37. ISSN 0098­3063 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCE.2014.6780922 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/36555/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCE.2014.6780922 
Publisher: IEEE 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 1 
 
Full Text of article 
 
 
Title:     Enhanced Three-factor Security Protocol for Consumer USB Mass Storage Devices 
 
Publication:  IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 
Volume:    60 
Issue:     1 
pp.:     30-37 
URL:    http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCE.2014.6780922  
DOI:    10.1109/TCE.2014.6780922 
 
Authors: 
Debiao He, School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China 
(e-mail: hedebiao@163.com). 
 
Neeraj Kumar, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Thapar University, 
Patiala, India (e-mail: neeraj.kumar@thapar.edu). 
 
Jong-Hyouk Lee, Senior Member, IEEE, Department of Computer Software Engineering, 
Sangmyung University, Republic of Korea (e-mail: jonghyouk@smu.ac.kr). 
 
R. Simon Sherratt, Fellow, IEEE, School of Systems Engineering, the University of 
Reading, RG6 6AY, UK (e-mail: sherratt@ieee.org). 
 
 
This work was supported by a 2013 Research Grant from Sangmyung University, Republic of Korea. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) is an extremely popular interface standard for computer peripheral 
connections and is widely used in consumer Mass Storage Devices (MSDs). While current consumer 
USB MSDs provide relatively high transmission speed and are convenient to carry, the use of USB 
MSDs has been prohibited in many commercial and everyday environments primarily due to security 
concerns. Security protocols have been previously proposed and a recent approach for the USB MSDs is 
to utilize multi-factor authentication. This paper proposes significant enhancements to the three-factor 
control protocol that now makes it secure under many types of attacks including the password guessing 
attack, the denial-of-service attack, and the replay attack. The proposed solution is presented with a 
rigorous security analysis and practical computational cost analysis to demonstrate the usefulness of this 
new security protocol for consumer USB MSDs. 
 
 
Index Terms 
 
Authentication, Consumer Storage, Mass Storage Device, USB. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) is a ubiquitous interface standard being widely used for connecting 
storage to consumer devices [1]. Because of its convenience and ease of connectivity, the USB port has 
become an essential component of consumer electronics devices such as flash disks, keyboards, cell 
phones, chargers, speakers, and printers. However, the USB interface has the following three weaknesses 
when it is used for consumer storage devices [2]: (1) anyone (e.g., an unauthorized user) could read or 
steal confidential information easily since the information is stored in plaintext format; and (2) an 
adversary could intercept or attack the transmitted information since the transmit channel between the 
device and the computer is not secure. Therefore, despite their practicality, USB Mass Storage Devices 
(MSDs) have been prohibited in an enormous number of environments. To solve these problems, and 
extend the applications of USB consumer storage devices, an authentication protocol can be 
implemented to ensure secure communications between the device and the computer. 
 
Ever since Lamport proposed the first authentication protocol [2], many authentication protocols have 
been proposed for different applications. Hwang and Li [3] proposed an authentication protocol using a 
smart card. However, their protocol could not withstand the masquerade attack. To improve security, Ku 
and Chen [4] proposed an improved authentication protocol using a smart card. Later, Yoon, Ryu and 
Yoo [5] found that Ku and Chen’s improved authentication protocol was however vulnerable to the 
parallel session attack, and subsequently proposed a new authentication protocol using a smart card, but 
Hsiang and Shih [6] later demonstrated that it was vulnerable to three kinds of attacks. Hsiang and Shih 
proposed their new authentication protocol using a smart card; however, Shim [7] found that Hsiang and 
Shih’s protocol was vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack. 
 
Kim and Hong [8] proposed a multimodal biometric authentication protocol that employed teeth, image 
and voice in mobile environments. To improve performance, Kim, Chung and Hong [9], and Lee, Kim 
and Cho [10] proposed two new protocols that all used person specific authentication using personal 
biometric characteristics such as face, teeth, and voice. However, all these protocols are not ideally 
suitable for USB MSDs because their stored information can easily be read out or require significant 
local complex computations. 
 
To protect the privacy of a file transferred to a storage device, Yang, Wu and Chiu [11] proposed the 
first secure control protocol using the Schnorr signature scheme [12]. However, Chen, Qin and Yu [13] 
indicated that Yang et al.’s protocol [11] was vulnerable to the forge and replay attacks. Besides, Lee, 
Chen and Wu [14] found that the performance of Yang et al. protocol [11] was computationally heavy 
due to significant modular exponentiation operations. To solve those problems, Lee et al. [14] proposed 
a three-factor authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) that requires the 
password, smart card, and biometric characteristic for authentication. 
 
Compared with the use of only password, biometric keys have the following advantages [15]: 
1) Biometric keys cannot be lost or forgotten; 
2) Biometric keys are very difficult to copy or share; 
3) Biometric keys are extremely hard to forge or distribute; 
4) Biometric keys cannot be guessed easily. 
 
Compared with the traditional public key cryptosystem, the ECC can provide better performance because 
it can achieve the same security level using a smaller key size. For example, the 160-bit ECC and 1024-
bit from the popular Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem have the same level of security [16]. 
Therefore, Lee et al. protocol [14] was previously considered to be more suitable for USB consumer 
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storage devices. However, this paper will demonstrate that the protocol is vulnerable to the password 
guessing attack, the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, and the replay attack. 
 
In this paper, an enhanced three-factor security protocol is introduced that removes the shortcomings of 
past three-factor security protocols. Detailed operations of the new protocol are provided with 
comprehensive security analysis that proves the robustness of the protocol against various attacks. 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II gives a review of the three-factor authentication 
protocol followed by its security issues discussed in Section III. Section IV introduces the proposed 
security protocol as part of this work. The protocol’s immunity from various attacks and other related 
features is analyzed in Section V. Section VI analyzes the proposed protocol’s computational cost. 
Section VII concludes the paper. 
 
II. Review of the Three-Factor Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem Protocol 
 
There are three phases in Lee et al. protocol [14]: (1) the registration phase; (2) the verification and data 
encryption phase; and (3) the key agreement phase. The details of these phases are described in this 
section. Notations used in this paper are first defined as follows: 
 
,p q :   two large prime numbers; 
pF :    finite field; 
( )pE F :  elliptic curve over pF  defined by the equation 
2 3y x ax b   , where , pa b F  
and 3 24 27 0a b  ; 
G :    cyclic additive group consisting of points on  
( )pE F  that has a specific point called the 
infinite point; 
P :    generator point of G with the order q; 
AS :   authentication server; 
U :    user; 
A :    adversary; 
UID :   user U’s identity; 
UB :   user U’s biometric characteristic (e.g., fingerprint); 
Upw :   user U’s password; 
x :    authentication server AS’s secret key; 
||:     concatenate operation; 
( )h  :   one-way hash function; 
nF :    encrypted filename; 
( )KE  :  symmetric encryption algorithm using a key K; 
( )KD  :  symmetric decryption algorithm using a key K. 
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A. System Environment 
 
To manage security for a USB MSD, AS restricts the data transfers over the USB interface. U is allowed 
to transfer data via the USB interface only when U could pass AS’s authentication. When U wishes to 
transfer a file to a storage device via the USB interface, U is required to input their username, password 
and biometric characteristic to verify legitimacy. 
 
When U is successfully authenticated, a shared session key is generated between U and AS. Then, the 
session key will be used to encrypt the files transferred via the USB interface. When U decrypts the files 
on the storage devices, U must do the same authentication and generate the same session key for the 
original file. Every filename and user’s identity will have a session key and different files or users’ 
identity have different session keys. To ensure system security, the temporarily stored session key will be 
deleted after encrypting or decrypting the file. Lee et al.’s protocol [14] has the following three 
characteristics: (1) only authorized users can access the USB consumer storage devices; (2) files taken 
from the storage devices cannot be decrypted without the session key; and (3) other legal users cannot 
decrypt a legal classified file even if it is copied to their storage device. Therefore the original file is 
secure. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Lee et al.’s three-factor authentication protocol. 
 
 
Lee et al.’s three-factor authentication protocol [14] is illustrated in Fig. 1. U inserts their storage device 
into a client terminal and inputs their password, identity and biometric signature (phase 1). Mutual 
authentication is then executed between U and AS (phase 2). U obtains a session key from AS if they are 
successfully authenticated (phase 3). With this key, U can store an encrypted file on the storage device. 
 
B. Registration Phase 
 
When U wants to be a legal user of AS, then U has to be registered through the following steps:  
1) U inputs their biometric characteristic 
UB  through a specified biometric device and provides a 
password, 
Upw  and identity UID . The system sends { , ( || )}U U UID h pw B  to AS. 
2) Upon receiving { , ( || )}U U UID h pw B , AS computes ( ( || ) || ( || ))U U U Ue h h ID x h pw B  and 
( || ) ( || )U U U Us h ID x h pw B  , where x  is AS’s secret key. Then AS stores { , }U Ue s  in U’s USB 
MSD and delivers it to U securely. 
3) Upon receiving data from the storage device, U computes ( )U U UBPW B h pw   and stores it in 
their storage device. Accordingly, the information { , , }U U Ue s BPW is stored in the storage device. 
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C. Verification and Data Encryption Phase 
 
When U accesses the storage device, the following steps are executed between U and AS for mutual 
authentication:  
1) U inserts their USB MSD into the client terminal, and inputs a password 
Upw , identity UID  and 
biometric characteristic 
UB . The device then computes ( )U U UB BPW h pw    and checks UB  and 
UB  are equal. If they are not equal, the device rejects U’s request; otherwise, the device computes 
( || )U U U Uw s h pw B   and checks if ( || ( || ))U U Uh w h pw B  and Ue  are equal. If they are not equal, the 
device again rejects U’s request; otherwise, the device generates a random number *
qa Z , 
computes aP  and ( || || )U Uh ID aP w  , where 
*
qZ  denotes the set {1, 2, , 1}q … . The message 
1 { , , , }U nm ID aP F   is sent to AS. 
2) Upon receiving the message m1, AS first checks the user’s identity. If it is not valid then AS rejects 
the request; otherwise, AS computes ( || )U Uw h ID x  and checks if ( || || )U Uh ID aP w  and   are equal. 
If they are not equal, AS rejects the request; otherwise, AS generates a random number *
qb Z  and 
computes bP , ( )sk b aP abP  , ( || )nn h x F  and ( || || || || )U Uh ID sk bP n w  . Then, AS sends the 
message 
2 { , ( ), }skm bP E n   to U. 
3) Upon receiving the message m2, U computes ( )sk a bP abP   and uses it to decrypt ( )skE n . Then, 
U  obtains ( || )nn h x F . U then checks if ( || || || || )U Uh ID sk bP n w  and   are equal. If they are equal 
then U has been successfully authenticated. 
 
D. Key Agreement Phase 
 
After completing mutual authentication, U computes an encrypted key, ( || )UK h ID n . When U wishes to 
access a file on the USB MSD, U uses the key to encrypt a file as ( )KE file  to ensure the security of the 
file on the storage device. If U needs to decrypt the file, U must follow the same steps to decrypt the file 
as ( ( ))K KD E file on the device. 
 
III. Security Analysis of the Three-Factor authentication Protocol Based on ECC 
 
In this section, the security of the three-factor authentication protocol is analyzed. 
 
A. Password Guessing Attack 
 
Assume that A has obtained U’s USB storage device. Then, A could read the stored information 
{ , , }U U Ue s BPW  from the device, where ( ( || ) || ( || ))U U U Ue h h ID x h pw B , ( || ) ( || )U U U Us h ID x h pw B   and 
( )U U UBPW B h pw  . However, A could obtain the password through the following steps:  
1) A guesses a password Upw  from a directory, D. 
2) A computes ( )U U UB BPW h pw    and ( || )U U U Uw s h pw B    . 
3) A checks if ( || ( || ))U U Uh w h pw B    and Ue  are equal. If they are equal, Upw  is the correct password; 
otherwise, A repeats steps 1)-3) until the correct password is found. 
 
With the found password and stored information ( )U U UBPW B h pw  , A could generate a legal login 
message like U normally does. Then, A could impersonate U to login to AS and obtain the secure data. 
Therefore, the protocol [14] is vulnerable to the password guessing attack as specifically could be the 
case where A has gained possession of U’s USB MSD this allowing A to do the attack. 
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B. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack 
 
In step 1) of the verification and data encryption phase, U inserts their USB storage device into the client 
terminal, and inputs their password 
Upw , identity UID  and biometric characteristic UB . The device then 
computes ( )U U UB BPW h pw    and checks if UB  and UB  are identical. If they are not equal, the device 
rejects U’s request. However, it is known that the inputted biometric characteristic of the same person 
can be somewhat different every time [17]. Then 
UB  and UB  are not equal and the device may reject U’s 
valid request. Therefore, the protocol [14] is somewhat vulnerable to the DoS attack due to the 
unrepeatability of biometric characteristic. 
 
C. Replay Attack 
 
Suppose A could control the communication channel between U and AS since messages are transmitted 
via an insecure channel in the login and key agreement phase. Therefore, A could intercept, insert, delete, 
or interpolate any messages at will. A could intercept a message m1 sent by U. Then, A could replay it to 
AS. Although A cannot compute the session key, A is successful as long as AS accepts the login request. 
Therefore, the protocol [14] is vulnerable to the replay attack. 
 
IV. The Proposed Protocol 
 
This section proposes significant enhancements to the three-factor authentication protocol. Before the 
proposed protocol operations are described, a fuzzy extractor [18] used in the proposed protocol is 
defined as illustrated below: 
 
Definition 1: - Metric Space [18]. A metric space is a set   with a distance function 
: [0, )dis R    which obeys various natural properties. One example of metric spaces is 
the Hamming metric : n =  is over some alphabet n  (e.g., {0,1}n  ) and ( , )dis    is the number of 
positions in which they differ. 
 
Definition 2: - Statistic Distance [18]. Statistic Distance is the distance between two probability 
distributions   and   and is denoted by 
1
( , ) | Pr[ ] Pr[ ] |
2 v
SD v v       . 
 
Definition 3: - Entropy [18]. The min-entropy ( )H   of a random variable   is log(max Pr[ ])a a  . 
 
A fuzzy extractor extracts a nearly random string   from its biometric characteristic input   in an 
error-tolerant way. If the input changes but remains close to  , then the extracted   remains the same. 
To assist in recovering   from a biometric characteristic input  , a fuzzy extractor outputs an auxiliary 
string  . However,   remains uniformly random for a given  . The fuzzy extractor is formally defined 
as below: 
 
Definition 4: - Fuzzy Extractor [18]. A ( , , , ,m l t  ) fuzzy extractor is given by two procedures, Gen and 
Rep:  
1) Gen is a probabilistic generation procedure, which on (biometric characteristic) input   
outputs an “extracted” string {0,1}l   and an auxiliary string  . For any distribution W on   of 
min-entropy m, if , ( )Gen W   , then ( , , , )lSD U        . Here, lU  denotes the uniform 
distribution on l-bit binary strings. 
2) Rep is a deterministic reproduction procedure allowing to recover   from the corresponding 
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auxiliary string   and any vector   close to  : for all ,   satisfying ( , )dis t   , if 
, ( )Gen W   , then ( , )Rep     . 
 
Like Lee et al. protocol [14], the proposed protocol in this paper also consists of the three phases, i.e., 
the registration phase, the verification and data encryption phase, and the key agreement phase. The 
system environment of the proposed protocol is the same as Lee et al. protocol. 
 
A. Registration phase 
 
When U wants to be a legal user of AS, the following steps are executed:  
1) U inputs their biometric characteristic 
UB  through a suitable biometric device and provides their 
password 
Upw  and identity UID . U then computes ( , ) ( )U U UGen B    and submits 
{ , ( || )}U U UID h pw   to AS. 
2) Upon receiving { , ( || )}U U UID h pw  , AS computes ( ( || ) || ( || ))U U U Ue h h ID x h pw   and 
( || ) ( || )U U U Us h ID x h pw   , where x is AS’s secret key. Then, AS stores { , }U Ue s  in U’s storage 
device and delivers it to U securely. 
3) Upon receiving the USB consumer storage device information, U computes ( )U U UBPW h pw   
and stores the result in the storage device. The storage device thus contains the information 
{ , , }U U Ue s BPW . 
 
B. Verification and Data Encryption Phase 
 
When U wants to access the USB MSD, the following steps are executed between U and AS for mutual 
authentication: 
1) U inserts their USB storage device into the client USB port and inputs their password 
Upw , 
identity 
UID  and biometric characteristic UB . The device computes ( )U U UBPW h pw   , 
( , )U U URep B  , and ( || )U U U Uw s h pw   . Then, it checks if ( || ( || ))U U Uh w h pw   and Ue  are 
equal. If they are not equal, the device rejects U’s request; otherwise, the device generates a 
random number *qa Z , and then computes aP  and ( || || || )U n Uh ID aP F w  . The message 
1 { , , , }U nm ID aP F   is then sent to AS. 
2) Upon receiving the message m1, AS checks the user’s identity first. If it not true, AS rejects the 
request; otherwise, AS computes ( || )U Uw h ID x  and checks if ( || || || )U n Uh ID aP F w  and   are 
equal. If they are not equal, AS rejects the request; otherwise, AS generates a random number 
*
qb Z  and computes bP , ( )sk b aP abP  , ( || )nn h x F  and ("0" || || || || || || || )U n Uh ID aP F bP n sk w  . 
The AS then sends the message 2 { , ( ), }skm bP E n   to U. 
3) Upon receiving the message m2, U computes ( )sk a bP abP   and uses it to decrypt ( )skE n . Then, 
U obtains ( || )nn h x F  and U checks if ("0" || || || || || || || )U n Uh ID aP F bP n sk w  and   are equal. If 
they are not equal, U stops the session; otherwise, it is authenticated. Next, U computes 
("1" || || || || || || || )U n Uh ID aP F bP n sk w   and sends the message 3 { }m   to AS. 
4) Upon receiving the message m3, AS checks if   and ("1" || || || || || || || )U n Uh ID aP F bP n sk w  are equal. 
If they are not equal, AS stops the session; otherwise, U is authenticated.  
 
C. Key Agreement Phase 
 
After completing mutual authentication, U computes an encrypted key ( || )UK h ID n . When U wants to 
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access the USB MSD, U uses the key to encrypt a file as ( )KE file  to ensure the security of the file on the 
storage device. If U needs to decrypt the file, then they must follow the same steps to decrypt the file as 
( ( ))K KD E file on the storage device. 
 
V. Security Analysis 
 
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed for USB consumer storage devices. 
Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic [19], [20] has been used to demonstrate that the proposed 
protocol provides secure authentication. Then, the security assessment is performed to test whether the 
proposed protocol can overcome weaknesses in past security algorithms. 
 
A. Authentication Proof Based on BAN-logic 
 
The notations of BAN logic are as follows: 
|P X :   The principal P believes a statement X, or  
P is entitled to believe X. 
#( )X :    The formula X is fresh. 
P X :  The principal P has jurisdiction over the 
statement X. 
P X :   The principal P sees the statement X. 
|~P X :   The principal P once said the statement X. 
( , )X Y :  The formula X or Y is one part of the 
formula (X, Y). 
YX  :  The formula X combined with the  
formula Y. 
{ }YX :   The formula X is encrypted under the  
key K. 
( )YX :   The formula X is hash with the key K. 
KP Q : The principals P and Q use the shared key 
K to communicate. The key K will never  
be discovered by any principal except P  
and Q. 
sk :     The session key used in the current session. 
 
 
Main logical postulates of the BAN logic are as follows: 
The message-meaning rule: 
| , { }
| |~
K
KP P Q P X
P Q X
 

 
The freshness-conjuncatenation rule: 
| #( )
| #( , )
P X
P X Y


 
The nonce-verification rule: 
| #( ), | |~
| |
P X P Q X
P Q X
 
 
 
The jurisdiction rule: 
| , | |
|
P Q X P Q X
P X
   

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According to the analytic procedures of the BAN logic, the proposed protocol must then satisfy the 
following test goals in order to prove the system is secure: 
 
Goal 1: | ( )KU U AS  ; 
Goal 2: | | ( )KU AS U AS    
Goal 3: | ( )KAS U AS   
Goal 4: | | ( )KAS U U AS    
Goal 5: | ( )skU U AS   
Goal 6: | | ( )skU AS U AS    
Goal 7: | ( )skAS U AS   
Goal 8: | | ( )skAS U U AS    
 
First, the proposed protocol is transformed to the idealized form as: 
 
Msg  1.  U AS : 
( || )( , , ) h ID xUU n U ASID aP F   
Msg  2.  AS U :  
( || )("0", , , , ) h ID xU
K sk
U AS
aP bP U AS U AS

   
Msg  3.  U S : 
( || )("1", , , , ) h ID xU
K sk
U AS
aP bP U AS U AS

   
 
Second, the following assumptions about the initial state of the protocol are made to analyze the 
proposed protocol: 
 
1A : | #( )U aP ; 
2A : | #( )AS bP ; 
3A : 
( || )
| ( )U
h ID x
U U AS  ; 
4A : 
( || )
| ( )U
h ID x
AS U AS  ; 
5A : | | ( )
KU AS U AS   ; 
6A : | | ( )
KAS U U AS   ; 
7A : | | ( )
skU AS U AS   ; 
8A : | | ( )
skAS U U AS   ; 
 
Third, the idealized form of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the BAN logic rules and the 
assumptions. The main proofs are stated as follows: 
 
According to Msg  1 , the following is obtained:  
( || )1 : ( , , ) h ID xUU n U ASS AS ID aP F    
 
According to
4A , the message-meaning rule is applied: 
2 : | |~ ( , , )U nS AS U ID aP F   
 
According to Msg  2 , the following is obtained: 
( || )3 : ("0", , , , ) h ID xU
K sk
U AS
S U aP bP U AS U AS

    
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According to
3A , the message-meaning rule is applied: 
4 : | |~ ("0", , , , )
K skS U AS aP bP U AS U AS     
 
According to
1A , the freshness-conjuncatenation rule is applied: 
5 : | | ("0", , , , )
K skS U AS aP bP U AS U AS      
 
According to
5S , the BAN logic rule is applied to break conjunctions to produce: 
6 : | | ( )
KS U AS U AS           Goal 2 
7 : | | ( )
skS U AS U AS          Goal 6 
 
According to 
5A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get: 
8 : | ( )
KS U U AS             Goal 1 
 
According to 
7A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get: 
9 : | ( )
skS U U AS            Goal 5 
 
According to Msg  3 , the following is obtained: 
( || )10 : ("1", , , , ) h ID xU
K sk
U AS
S AS aP bP U AS U AS

    
 
According to
4A , the message-meaning rule is applied: 
11 : | |~ ("0", , , , )
K skS AS U aP bP U AS U AS     
 
According to
2A , the freshness-conjuncatenation rule is applied to get: 
12 : | | ("1", , , , )
K skS AS U aP bP U AS U AS       
 
According to
12S , the BAN logic rule is applied to break conjunctions to produce: 
13 : | ( )
KS AS U U AS           Goal 3 
14 : | | ( )
skS AS U U AS           Goal 7 
 
According to
6A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get 
15 : | ( )
KS AS U AS           Goal 4 
 
According to
8A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get 
16 : | ( )
skS AS U AS           Goal 8 
 
According to Goal 1 – Goal 8, both U and AS know that a session key sk abP  and an encrypted key 
( || )UK h ID n have successfully been shared between U and AS. 
 
B. Security Assessment 
 
1) Password guessing attack 
 
Assume an adversary A has stolen the user U’s USB MSD. Then, they could read the stored information 
{ , , }U U Ue s BPW  from the device. A could guess a password Upw  and compute ( )U U UBPW h pw   . 
However, A cannot compute the corresponding U  without U’s biometric characteristic. Therefore, they 
cannot verify the correctness of 
Upw . Therefore, the proposed protocol should withstand the password 
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guessing attack. 
 
2) DoS attack 
 
In the proposed protocol, the inputted biometric characteristic of the same person are also different every 
time. However, the device can get the correct  
U  through the fuzzy extractor algorithm. Therefore, U 
can pass the device’s verification and the proposed algorithm thus withstands the DoS attack. 
 
3) Replay attack 
 
Suppose adversary A intercepts the message m1 sent by U and replays it back to AS. Without knowing 
value 
Uw , A cannot compute   for a newly generated bP . Then, AS could determine the attack by 
checking the correctness of  . A may intercept the message m2 sent by AS and replay it to U. However, 
U can identify the attack by checking the correctness of   since a  is generated for every session. 
Therefore, the proposed algorithm should withstand the replay attack. 
 
4) Stolen-verifier attack 
 
In the proposed protocol, AS maintains no password table at all. Therefore, the proposed algorithm 
should withstand the stolen-verifier attack. 
 
5) Impersonation attack 
 
Suppose an adversary A wants to impersonate U to AS. A could generate a random number *qa Z  and 
compute aP . However, A cannot compute   since A does not know 
Uw . Furthermore, AS can find the 
attack by checking the correctness of  . Suppose A intercepts the message m1 and wants to impersonate 
U to AS, however in this case A cannot compute   without the value Uw . U can also identify the attack 
by checking the correctness of  . Therefore, the proposed protocol should withstand the impersonation 
attack. 
 
6) Mutual authentication: 
 
The proposed protocol allows that only U knows U ’s secret key, ( || )U Uw h ID x , otherwise AS’s secret 
key x  could generate the legal message   and  . Then, U and AS can confirm 2m  and 3m  are sent by 
AS and U by checking the correctness of   and   separately. The proposed protocol thus should provide 
mutual authentication between U and AS. 
 
7) Man-in-the-middle attack: 
 
From the above description, it has been shown that the proposed protocol should provide mutual 
authentication between U and AS, therefore by definition, the proposed algorithm should also withstand 
the man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
VI. Computational Cost Analysis 
 
In this section, the proposed protocol is compared with Yang et al. protocol [11] and Lee et al. protocol 
[14] in terms of relative computational cost. This work analyzed the target protocols [11], [14] and 
explicitly divided the protocols’ operations in terms of crypto-operations. Then, the relative 
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computational times and the absolute times were subsequently calculated as before [14], [21]. Notations 
are as follows: 
 
hashT :  Time for executing a hash function; 
symT :  Time for executing a symmetric key cryptography; 
pmT :  Time for executing an elliptic curve point  
multiplication; 
meT :  Time for executing a modular exponentiation; 
feT :  Time for executing a fuzzy extractor. 
 
TABLE I shows the relative cost comparisons for Yang et al. protocol, Lee et al. protocol, and the 
proposed protocol in this paper. The total computational cost of the verification and data encryption 
phase of Yang et al. protocol, Lee et al. protocol, and the proposed protocol are 10
meT +5 hashT +2 symT , 
4
pmT +9 hashT +2 symT  and 4 pmT +9 hashT +2 symT + feT  respectively. To be precise, the computational time of a 
one-way hashing operation, a symmetric encryption/decryption operation, modular exponentiation 
operation and an elliptic curve point relative multiplication operation is 0.00032 s, 0.0056 s, 0.0192 s and 
0.0171 s respectively [14]. The total relative computational time of Yang et al. protocol, Lee et al. 
protocol, and the proposed protocol are 0.20488 s, 0.08248 s and 0.09958 s, respectively. The proposed 
protocol requires the fuzzy extractor that can be constructed from universal hash functions or error-
correcting codes requiring only lightweight operations [18]. It is here assumed that the time for executing 
a fuzzy extractor is the same as that for executing an elliptic curve point multiplication at the most. Note 
that the elliptic curve point multiplication is considered as a complicated and time-consuming operation 
among the cryptographic operations. 
 
The proposed protocol and Lee et al. protocol both show better computation performance than Yang et 
al. protocol as expected; while at the same time the proposed protocol addresses the vulnerabilities in 
Lee et al. protocol with a small extra computational cost. Hence, the proposed protocol is suitable for 
practical applications in terms of security reliability and computational efficiency. 
 
TABLE I 
COMPUTATIONAL COST COMPARISONS 
 User Authentication Server Total 
Yang et al. 
protocol [11] 
 
4
meT +3 hashT + 
1
symT  0.08336 
6
meT +2 hashT + 
1
symT  0.12144 
10
meT +5 hashT + 
2
symT  0.20488 
Lee et al. 
protocol [14] 
 
2 pmT +5 hashT + 
1 symT  0.0414 
2 pmT +4 hashT + 
1 symT  0.04108 
4 pmT +9 hashT + 
2 symT  0.08248 
Proposed 
protocol 
2 pmT +5 hashT + 
1 symT + feT  
0.0585 
2 pmT +4 hashT + 
1 symT  0.04108 
4 pmT +9 hashT + 
2 symT + feT  
 0.09958 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The three-factor authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem for USB consumer 
storage devices has been shown to have significant advantages, but as presented in this paper, there were 
still existing security vulnerability issues needed to be solved, specifically the password guessing attack, 
the DoS attack and the replay attack. This paper has presented a significantly enhanced security protocol 
to address previous weaknesses. The proposed protocol has been presented and rigorously analyzed in 
 13 
 
terms of security and computational cost. As shown, the proposed protocol is robust against conceivable 
attacks while at the same time having the same computational cost compared to the literature. The work 
is ideal to be embedded in the firmware of consumer based USB Mass Storage Devices thus relieving the 
user of extra security burdens and enabling the devices to be confidently used in the knowledge that the 
data stored is secure. 
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